Michael Hoover

From Judgepedia

Michael Hoover is one of four presiding judges in the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Hoover is the presiding judge for District III headquartered in Wausau.

Contents 1 Background 2 Other Professional Affliations 3 Ziegler Campaign Contreversory 4 Catholic Pharamacist Contraception Contreversory 5 Other Key Cases 6 Personal 7 Notes

Background

Hoover was first elected in 1997 to become an appeallate judge on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Prior to being on the Court of Appeals, Hoover was a Circuit Court Judge in Marathon County from 1988 to 1997. From 1980 to 1988 Hoover was an Attorney in private practice and also served as the Assistant City Attorney for Wausau. Hoover started his legal career as an Assistant District Attorney for Marathon County from 1978-1980^[1].

Other Professional Affliations

• Author/Editor, Wisconsin Criminal Law Benchbook Committee
• Instructor/Speaker, Judicial Education and the State Bar
• Former Faculty, Mount Senario College

Ziegler Campaign Contreversory

In 2007, Michael Hoover has to recuse himself from discipline proceedings against Supreme Court Justice Annette Ziegler.

First District Appeals Court Judge Ted Wedemeyer, Jr. replaced Third District Court of Appeals Judge Michael Hoover on the panel after it was revealed that Hoover gave Ziegler's Supreme Court campaign $100 in 2006. The panel retained other judges Charles P. Dykman and Ralph Adam Fine during the proceedings in which Annette Ziegler was given a reprimand^[2].

Catholic Pharamacist Contraception Contreversory

(2008) Wisconsin Pharmacy Examining Board v. Noesen

This case drew state and National Attention as Judge Michael Hoover upheld the sanctions against a Catholic pharmacist who refused to dispense contraceptive drugs on the grounds of religious conscience. Hoover ruled in favour of the decision of the Wisconsin Pharmacy Examining Board to reprimand Neil Noesen and place limits on his license.

Neil Noesen, a believing Catholic, was working as a substitute pharmacist at a K-mart department store in Menomonie, Wisconsin in the summer of 2002, when a young college student asked him to re-fill a prescription for hormonal contraceptives. Noesen refused to fill the prescription for the abortifacient drug or refer to another pharmacist who would comply with the request. When the woman took her prescription to a Wal-Mart pharmacist, Noesen refused to provide the Wal-Mart pharmacist with the prescription information.

The woman lodged a complaint and the Wisconsin Pharmacy Examining Board found Noesen had "engaged in practice which constitutes a danger to the health, welfare, or safety of a patient" and had "practiced in a manner which substantially departs from the standard of care ordinarily exercised by pharmacists and which harmed or could have harmed a patient."

Noesen argued that the Wisconsin state constitution protected his right to abstain from "impairing the fertility of a human being" which he believes is objectively evil.

Judge Hoover disagreed, ruling that Noesen "prevented all the efforts [the woman] made to obtain her medication elsewhere when he refused to complete the transfer."

"The board could therefore properly conclude that he violated a standard of care applicable to pharmacists."

Noesen's lawyer appealed the decision to the Wisconsin Supreme Court as the case is awaiting to be heard.

This decision extended beyond the courts as both pro-religous and anti-religous advocates clashed in their opinons

Kim Wadas, the associate director for education and health care for the Wisconsin Catholic Bishops' Conference called the ruling "a step in the right direction".

"We were excited to see some of that language, which continued to recognize that pharmacists have a right of conscience," Wadas said. "This is something we advocate for on behalf of health professionals, especially Catholic health professionals." The same Kim Wadas also gave testimony to a Wisconsin Senate Committee on the moral liceity of directly abortifacient drugs, saying, "Catholic hospitals in Wisconsin can and do treat [rape] victims with emergency contraception."

Contrary to Wadas' supportive reaction to the decision against Noesen, however, the court rulings found that the protection of conscience does not extend to the absolute refusal to participate in the dispensing of abortifacient drugs, an act understood by Catholics to be an objectively evil one.

An administrative law judge upheld the Pharmacy Board's judgement, noting that the state pharmacy licensing regulations only allows conscientious objection if the pharmacist is willing to "ensure that there is an alternative mechanism for the patient to receive his or her medication, including informing the patient of their options to obtain their prescription." Catholic ethicists, however, hold that this constitutes "material co-operation in an objective evil".

In agreement with Wadas, Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, an anti-Christian organisation, also saw the ruling as a positive and important step, but specifically as one toward greater suppression of conscience rights of religious people.

Lauren Smith wrote on the group's website, "It's difficult to understate this ruling's importance. Pharmacist refusals are increasingly problematic, and Noesen is one of the first rulings weighing the states' authority to protect public welfare against an individual's alleged freedom of conscience."

This ruling sparked further debate on the national level if Catholics in the health care professions are allowed to not dipense contraception based on their religous beliefs ^[3].

Other Key Cases

(2006) Wisconsin v. Dewitt

This was a case that ruled about how bail jumping can be ruled in Wisconsin Circuit Courts. The case ruled [The defendant] was not obligated to sign the bond, especially if he knew he would not be posting cash bond. Thus, while not physically released, Dewitt was released as contemplated by Wis. Stat. sec. 969.02 when he fulfilled the signature bond.”

The defendant, Travis S. Dewitt, was facing seven different charges in three separate cases in Taylor County.

On Jan. 25, 2006, the circuit court held a bond hearing for all three cases. In the misdemeanor case, he imposed a $500 signature bond; in each of the two felony cases, he imposed a $500 cash bond.

The misdemeanor bond, and one of the felony bonds, included a condition that he have no contact with Kayla Langiewicz. Dewitt signed the signature bond, but did not post the cash bonds until Feb. 13, 2006.

Dewitt allegedly called Langiewicz nine times between the date he signed the bond, and when he was released. As a result, the state charged him with nine counts of bail jumping, based on the no contact provision in the misdemeanor case.

Dewitt ultimately entered a plea agreement, under which, among other provisions, he pleaded guilty to three counts of bail jumping.

Dewitt subsequently moved to withdraw his pleas, arguing that the bail jumping charges were “legally unsupportable,” and thus the plea agreement was “illusory.”

The court denied the motions, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The appellate court acknowledged that it could dismiss the appeal on waiver grounds, but chose to address the merits.

The bail jumping statute, sec. 946.49, provides that someone who has been released from custody, but who intentionally fails to comply with the terms of the bond is guilty of bail jumping.

However, the statute does not define “released.” The court acknowledged that the common meaning of the term contemplates physical discharge from custody.

Nevertheless, it concluded that Dewitt could violate the condition of his bond, despite never actually being “released.”

The court noted that, pursuant to sec. 969.02(3)(d), a court can release a defendant, with a condition that he return to custody after specified hours.

Therefore, the court concluded, “Because it would be absurd to conclude that conditions of release would then apply when the defendant was outside the jail, but be ‘turned off’ upon return to custody, it is evident that ‘release’ refers to the defendant posting the bond, be it signature or cash, and need not be accompanied by the defendant’s physical departure from the jailhouse.”

However, attorney William E. Schmaal, who represents Dewitt on appeal, said in an interview that he does not agree with the court’s concerns regarding sec. 969.02(3) (d). Schmaal said, “It doesn’t make sense that it is absurd to say, if he is released from jail, he can be charged, but when he is back at jail, he is not released. It is perfectly reasonable, and not absurd at all.”

Schmaal said he has not decided whether to seek review in the Supreme Court, but has recommended that his client do so.

The court also distinguished the case of State v. Orlik, 226 Wis.2d 527, 595 N.W.2d 468 (Ct.App.1999).

Orlik was charged with bail jumping for violating a no contact order while in custody. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, because he was never released from custody.

However, Orlik remained in custody because of inability to post the cash bond in that case; Dewitt, in contrast, remained in custody for other reasons.

By signing the bond, the court concluded, he committed himself to following its conditions^[4].

(1989) Wisconsin v. Esker

This was a high profile murder case that Hoover presided when he was a Circuit Court Judge in Marathon County. Lori Esker who was a one time dairy princess in Marathon County was accused of the murder of Lisa Cibaski after Esker was jealous over her former boyfriend Bill Buss was going to be re-united with Cibasaki.

After Cibaski was known to be pregnant this set Lori Esker to commit the murder of Lisa Cibaski when Esker was at the Unversity of Wisconsin-River Falls one night she went back to Wausau to confront Cibaski at where she worked at the Howard Johnson in Sunshinereview:Wausau, Wisconsin Wausau in which she grabbed a belt and wrapped it around her neck.

A jury in a Marathon County Circuit Court found Esker guilty in 1989 and sentenced her to life in prison, but Hoover made Esker eligible for parole in 2003^[5].

Personal

Hoover both recieved his Bachelor's and Juris Doctorate degrees from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1974 and 1978.

Notes