Justice Maupin on Negligence
From Judgepedia
In a 4-3 decision, Justice Maupin concurred with the majority opinion, authored by Justice Parraguirre, over the dissents of Justices Gibbons, Douglas, and Cherry, which concluded that a professional baseball team, which printed injury disclaimers on tickers, posted warning signs and made announcements concerning the danger of foul balls hit into the crowd, was not liable for the severe injuries caused by a foul ball that struck a patron sitting in a Beer Garden without protective screening as a matter of law. The majority expressly held that stadium owners have a limited duty to protect against injuries sustained from foul balls, and that once this duty is satisfied by providing sufficient protected seating, stadium owners have “no remaining duty to protect spectators from foul balls, which are a known, obvious, and unavoidable part of all baseball games.”
In contrast, the dissent, authored by Justice Gibbons, argued that the negligence claim should not be dismissed as a matter of law because the patron was sitting in the Beer Garden, and the Limited Duty Rule should not be applied to areas outside of the stands because the Limited Duty Rule is a very specific exception to the general standard of care principles under Nevada’s comparative negligence system.
- ON LIMITING THE ROLE OF THE JURY THROUGH THE ADOPITION OF THE LIMITED DUTY RULE: “Recognizing the importance of establishing parameters around personal injury litigation stemming from professional baseball in Nevada, we take this opportunity to expressly adopt the limited duty rule.” “The limited duty rule establishes the totality of the duty owed by baseball stadium owners and operators to protect spectators from foul balls within the confines of the stadium.”
- ON THE ROLE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE IN FOUL BALL INJURY CASES: “Because Berrum was decided before the enactment of Nevada’s comparative negligence statute, however, and it did not thoroughly consider the issue of ‘duty,’ it provides little guidance here.”
- ON THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LIMITED DUTY RULE: “First, the rule requires stadium owners and operators to provide a sufficient amount of protected seating for those spectators ‘who may be reasonably anticipated to desire protected seats on an ordinary occasion.’ Second, it requires stadium owners and operators to provide protection for all spectators located in the most dangerous parts of the stadium, that is, those areas that pose an unduly high risk of injury from foul balls (such as directly behind home plate).”
- ON THE REASONING OF THE LIMITED DUTY RULE: “By defining the duty of a baseball stadium owner or operator with specificity, the limited duty rule shields the stadium owner or operator from the need to take precautions that are clearly unreasonable while also establishing the outer limits of liability. In addition, “[it] serves the important purpose of limiting expensive and protracted litigation that “might signal the demise or substantial alteration of the game of baseball as a spectator sport.”
- ON THE HIGH RISK OF DANGER REQUIREMENT: “The risk of an occasional foul ball, however, does not amount to ‘an unduly high risk of injury.’ Indeed, Mrs. Turner has conspicuously failed to demonstrate that any other spectator suffered injuries as a result of errant balls landing in the Beer Garden. Thus, we conclude that she failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the 51s' negligence, and the 51s were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
- ON THE SCOPE OF THE LIMITED DUTY RULE AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILTY: "The dissent reasons that summary judgment is inappropriate because the limited duty rule does not extend to areas outside of the stands, such as the Beer Garden. In reaching this determination, the dissent applies the limited duty rule to the stands but then concludes that traditional negligence principles apply to other areas of the ballpark. In doing so, the dissent creates a ‘shifting or moveable duty of care,’ which is triggered by the plaintiff's unilateral and volitional decision to move between parts of the stadium. In our view, the defendant's duty should not change at the plaintiff's impulse, and only one duty of care should apply with respect to the general ‘peril of objects leaving the playing field.’”
- THE ROLE OF THE JURY IN DETERMINING DUTY AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK: "Several other courts that have recognized duty as a legal question also have recognized that the primary implied assumption of risk doctrine merely ‘goes to the initial determination of whether the defendant's legal duty encompasses the risk encountered by the plaintiff.’ These courts treat the doctrine as a part of the initial duty analysis, rather than as an affirmative defense to be decided by a jury. In our opinion, this is a better application of the doctrine, and one that makes it compatible with our comparative negligence statute. Accordingly, we overrule Mizushima to the extent that it held that the primary implied assumption of risk doctrine was abolished by our comparative negligence statute. Whether that doctrine bars a plaintiff's claim should be incorporated into the district court's initial duty analysis, and therefore it should not be treated as an affirmative defense to be decided by a jury.”
- PUBLIC POLICY REASONING FOR NOT EXPANDING LIMITED DUTY RULE: “Since Mrs. Turner was sitting in the Beer Garden and not in the stands at the time of her injury, the limited duty rule should not apply. As the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized, to apply the limited duty rule ‘to [an] entire stadium would convert reasonable protection for owners to immunity by virtually eliminating their liability for foreseeable, preventable injuries to their patrons even when the fans are no longer engaged with the game.’ Thus, ‘[b]ecause principles of fairness, and by implication public policy, support the application of traditional tort concepts to areas outside of the stands,’ we should not expand the scope of the limited duty rule past the stands. Instead, the limited duty rule is a very specific, historically based exception to the general rule that traditional negligence standard of care principles apply under Nevada's comparative negligence system.”
