Justice Kimball on Discrimination and Equal Protection
From Judgepedia
2007
- Justice Kimball concurred in the majority opinion of the Court, which concluded that a mother who exposed her children to her lesbian relationship was not entitled to keep custody of those children.
ISSUES:
The issue before the court was whether a mother's living with and otherwise exposing her children to her lesbian partner warranted change of custody.
HOLDING:
The Court upheld the trial court's findings that, in exposing her children to her lesbian relationship, the mother enganged in a pattern of misconduct which demonstrated a disregard for the best interests of the children. The court further found that the mother's lesbian partner did not represent an appropriate parental figure for the children.
REASONING:
- (1) The mother allowed her lesbian partner to visit her home while the children were with her.
- (2) The mother occasionally had her lesbian partner attend the children's special events with her.
POTENTIAL FLAWS IN THE COURT'S REASONING:
- (1)
- Justice Kimball concurred in the majority opinion of the Court, which concluded a white district attorney should have recused himself from the prosecution of "The Jana 6," six African-American highschool students who attacked a white student, because his past behavior indicated a bias towards vigorous prosecution of blacks, and insufficient prosecution of whites.
ISSUES:
The issue before the Court was whether LaSalle Parish District Attorney J. Reed Walters abused his prosecutorial authority by taking race into account when exercising his charging authority
HOLDING:
The Court held that the District Attorney should have recused himself.
REASONING:
- (1) "In a public statement, the District Attorney stated his intent to charge ["the Jana 6," six teenage african-american boys] with the harshest crimes, adn to seek the maximum penalty allowed by law, while characteriing efforts to indimdate African-Americans as a 'prank' and bringing only misdemeanor charges against the whites who assaulted Bailey."
- (2) The District Attorney had a conflict of interest because he was an advisor to the LaSalle Parish School Board, and his involvement in the decision to expel Bailey.
- (3) "Our Justice system has failed if citizens can not expect equal protection of the law and equal application of the law."
POTENTIAL FLAWS IN THE COURT'S REASONING:
- (1) Arguably, the Court jumps to the conclusion that the District Attorney's actions were inequitable without adequately considering the factual circumstances surrounding each decision. To be specific, the Court finds that the District Attorney was racially motivated because he charged "the Jena 6" with conspiracy to commit murder and attempted murder, while only suspending white students who hung nooses for three days. In drawing this conclusion, the court relies upon the fact that the white victim of "the Jena 6" was able to leave the hospital within three hours of checking in. However, the extent of the victim's injuries are not the determinative factor when considering whether "the Jena 6" conspired to murder him, or whether they attempted to murder him.
- (2) Similarly, the Court did not cite to any evidence indicating that the three-day suspension for hanging the nooses was disproportionate to punishments for similar acts that may have been perpetrated by African-American students, or that expulsion was not equitable, consistent level of discipline for fighting.
- (3) By referencing the hanging of the nooses, the court may have been attempting to demonstrate that the Jena 6 were entitled to a certain level of animosity towards white students. However, the noose incident took place over three months prior to the attach on the white student.
- Justice Kimball concurred in the dissenting opinion of Justice Jeannette Theriot Knoll. In doing so, he dissented from the majority opinion, written by Justice Bernette J. Johnson, which found that a prosecutor consciously and impermissibly took race into account where he, in a death penalty case with a black defendant who was convicted of first degree murder, failed to select a black juror who had filed a discrimination lawsuit against the state for "institutional discrimination."
ISSUES:
The issue before the Court was whether a prosecutor may refrain from seating a black potential juror in a case with a black defendant where the potential juror has filed a discrimination lawsuit against the state which alleges "insitutional discrimination."
HOLDING:
The Majority held overturned the defendant's conviction for first degree murder and accompanying death sentence. It held that the state violated the black defendant's constitutional rights when it, by and through the prosecuting attorney, victoriously challenged the seating of a black juror who had filed a discrimination lawsuit against the state which alleged institutional racism.
The Dissent concluded that (1) the potential juror's sensitivity to discrimination was a constitutional reason for failing to seat the defendant; and that (2) even if its was not, the state had adequately demonstrated other reasons for dismissing the potential juror.
MAJORITY REASONING:
- (1) "There was no attempt by the State to explain how bias might operate from the mere existence of this lawsuit. [The potential juror] was never questioned about the impact the lawsuit would have on his ability to serve as a juror."
- (2) The prosecutor "explicity place[d] race at issue, without any attempt to explain why race might be a relevant consideration in this instance."
- (3) Even though the state also indicated that the potential juror's body language during his response to the propriety of capital punishment was disfavorable, "[o]nce an inappropriate explanation inoking racial considerations is made, a subsequent, valid reason for exercising the peremptory challenge cannot purge the racial taint."
- (4) "It is true that peremptories are often the subject of instict, and it can sometiems be hard to say what the reason is. But when illegitimate grounds like race are at issue, a prosecutor simply has got to state his reasons as best he can and stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons he gives."
- (5) "A juror is entitled to be evaluated for service on a jury without reference to race. That fundamental guarantee is violated when the State conciously takes reace into account in excluding a juror from service."
DISSENT'S REASONING:
In upholding the defendant's death sentence, the dissenting opinion, written by Justice Knoll, reasoned as follows:
- (1) The potential juror indicated that "if he was 100 percent on the evidence, the death penalty may be okay." Further, his body language indicated an aversion to the death penalty, and body language has been held to be a valid, race-neutral reason for striking a juror.
- (2) "The state was concerned with [the potential juror's] sensitivity to discrimination, as evident in his filing a discrimination suit against his employer. The interjection of race on the State's part was to illustrate its concern with the potential impartiality or neutrality of this juror, not as to its racial motiviation for striking the juror.
- (3) Even the defendant failed to raise the issue that the state's peremptory challenge of this juror was unconstitutional.
- (4) "The sensitivity of this juror to discrimination was a plausible reason for striking him, and the trial court found it adequate."
- (5) "The majority's rejection of the State's explanation in this case, in my view, raises the bar from a clear and reasonably specific explanation to a perfect answer in order to uphold a race-neutral reason."
- (6) "in [our] view, this approach is going far afield from what is required to uphold a race-neutral explanation and would effectively render any otherwise valid race-neutral reason espoused by either side constitutionally invalid by the mere mention of race."
- (7) The potential juror's ongoing discrimination lawsuit against his employer was a race-neutral reason for supporting a peremptory strike.
