Dale Wainwright
From Judgepedia
Dale Wainwright is a Associate Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. He was first elected to a six-year term on the Court in November 2002, and his term ends December 31, 2008. He replaced Deborah Hankinson on the Court.
In 2008, Wainwright, who is running as a Republican, faces an election challenge from trail lawyer and Democrat Sam Houston. (See Texas Supreme Court elections).
Biography
Judge Dale Wainwright and his wife, Debbie, have three sons – Jeremy, Phillip and Joshua – and are members of the Second Baptist Church.[1] He earned his law degree from the University of Chicago Law School, studied at the London School of Economics and earned his undergraduate degree from Howard University, summa cum laude, and serves on the Visiting Committees of the University of Chicago Law School and South Texas College of Law.[2]
Legal Education and Experience
Along with Wallace Jefferson, Wainwright is one of only two African Americans ever elected to the Texas Supreme Court. Justice Wainwright was appointed to the civil district court in 1999 by then-Gov. George W. Bush. The Houston bar gave Judge Wainwright a 90 percent approval rating in the judicial evaluation poll, with almost two-thirds of that rating being "outstanding." He resolved over 3,000 cases and reduced his docket by approximately 20 percent. He was responsible for supervising the ancillary docket and scheduling trials of mass tort cases for the 25 civil district courts in Harris County.
Wallace Jefferson, initially appointed by Governor Rick Perry in 2001, was re-elected to his seat in 2002 in the same election where Wainwright won an open seat to the Court - the first non-incumbent African American in the history of the State of Texas elected to the Texas Supreme Court.[3] Wainwright was the presiding judge of the 334th Civil Court of Harris County, Texas before joining the Texas Supreme Court.
Before his appointment to the bench, Justice Wainwright practiced in the trial sections of the firms of Haynes and Boone and Andrews & Kurth in Houston.
Awards and Associations
Justice Wainwright has a long history of public service, having co-founded the Aspiring Youth Program, a national program to assist inner-city youth; served on the board of directors of the Houston Bar Association, the Houston Volunteer Lawyers Program and the Texas Young Lawyers Association; and served as president of the Houston Young Lawyers Association. He received the Legal Excellence Award in 2000 from the NAACP and was recognized for outstanding legal service by the Houston Lawyers Association. In 1995, Chief Justice Tom Phillips appointed him to a task force of the Texas Commission on Judicial Efficiency. He has also volunteered at the YMCA and coached Little League baseball. Wainwright is a member of the American Law Institute.[4]
Political Affiliation and Judicial Philosophy
Republican. Wainwright's judicial philosophy is encapsulated in this statement:"Our great task is to interpret and apply the Constitution and laws, as written, fairly and consistently without fear or favor. I will always remember that my fundamental objective for donning this robe is to serve this great purpose."[5]
"Family is important, God is important, patriotism in our country and helping improve it and defend it are all important things," he said. "Those values are the reason why the glass ceiling can be broken and is being broken now."[6]
Endorsements
In all the 2008 judicial polls — for the State Bar of Texas, the Houston Bar and the Tarrant County Bar[7] — the attorneys of Texas have voted Justice Wainwright best qualified to serve on the Supreme Court by nearly a two to one margin over his general election opponent.[8]
Justice Wainwright has received extensive endorsements, including James Baker, U.S. Secretary of State (Former), Baker & Botts, Houston; Harriett Miers, Locke Lord & Bissell, Dallas; the last 16 past Houston bar association presidents and Texans for Lawsuit Reform PAC. A full list of his endorsements can be seen here.
Quotes
- Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison has described Justice Wainwright as "one of the outstanding stars on the Supreme Court in Texas."
- The Dallas Morning News stated that he "has been a strong voice for scholarly fairness."
- The Austin-American Statesman predicted that "Wainwright has all the makings of a Texas political star."[9]
Videos
Justice Wainwright campaign ad:
Justice Wainwright on the importance of the courts and the election:
Supreme Court Campaigns
2002 Contributions
In the 2002 campaign, Dale Wainwright raised $1,091,616.[10] The top three industry contributors were:
- Lawyers and Lobbyists, $576,046
- Oil and Gas, $79,469
- Health Professionals, $43,791
2006 Contributions
In the 2006 campaign, Wainwright did not run, but $11,765 was contributed.[11]
2008 Contributions
In the 2008 campaign, the elections are not completed, but as yet, Wainwright has raised $320,146. The top three industries so far are Lawyers and Lobbyists, Oil and Gas, and Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate.[12]
For a complete summary of Dale Wainwright's campaign contributions, visit Follow the Money: Dale Wainwright.
In the News: Articles
On the Issues
On Contract Enforcement
Issue: Does an axle-wheel assembly spearated from an unidentified semi-trailer constitute a "motor vehicle" in order to satisfy the "actual physical contact" provision of Texas's unisured motorist statute?
Factual and Procedural History: On January 4, 2002, a station wagon collided with a drive axle and attached tandem wheels that had seperated from an eighteen-wheel semi-trailer truck. The unidentified truck, which was being driven in the opposite direction across the divided highway, did not stop. Momentum carried the axle-wheel assembly across the dividing median where it struck the station wagon, injurying the occupants and damaging the car. The County Court, Ellis County, granted insurer's summary jdugment motion, and insured appealled. The Waco Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Insurer petitioned for review.
Governing Rule: [F]or the insured to recover under the uninsured motorist coverage if the owner or operator of any motor vehicle that causes bodily injury or property damage to the insured is unknown, actual physical contact must have occurred between the motor vehicle owned or operated by the unknown person and the person or property of the insured[14]
Summary: Justice Wainwright, over the dissents of Justices O'Neill and Medina, ruled that an insurance compnay was not required to pay an uninsured motorist claim because an axle-wheel assembly seperated from an unidentified semi-trailer does not constitute a "motor vehicle," and therefore, does not fall within the terms of the policy and the Texas Insurance Code. The Court held: (1) motor vehicles are self-propelled (2) the collision does not involve a legally recognized substitute for the statute's actual physical contact requirement (3) adopting an integral part test to determine whehter actual physical contact occured would be inconsistent with the test established by the legislature and would be unmanageable
- ON WHY THE AXLE-WHEEL ASSEMBLY IS NOT A MOTOR VEHICLE: "A drive axle with two tandem wheels attached on one side lacks an engine or other means of propulsion. It is therefore neither a self-propelled vehicle nor a vehicle propelled by electric power from overhead wires. This wheel assemblage is not capable of carrying a load, nor can it be towed down a road by a self-propelled vehicle other than being dragged by or mounted underneath one, as Elchehimi's expert witness testified. The axle-wheel assembly is thus not a trailer or semitrailer designed for use with a self-propelled vehicle. The axle-wheel assembly is not a motor vehicle under Chapter 601. Applying the common usage of the term and the definition in Chapter 601, we conclude that physical contact with a detached axle and tandem wheels is not actual physical contact with a motor vehicle under the unidentified motor vehicle provision."
- ON WHY THE COLLISION DID NOT INVLOVE A LEGALLY RECOGNIZED SUBSTITUTE FOR THE STATUTE'S ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTACT REQUIREMENT: "Because the axle-wheel assembly is not a motor vehicle, it cannot fill the role of an intermediary vehicle to provide indirect contact between the unidentified truck and Plaintiff's vehicle." No other substitute exists for the requirement of actual physical contact with the motor vehicle itself. Texas courts have uniformly rejected the contention that a collision with cargo and other objects falling from a car satisfies the requirement of actual physical contact with a motor vehicle[15]
- ON WHY THE COURT DID NOT ADOPT THE INTEGRAL PART TEST: "We decline, however, to adopt an integral part test not present in the text of the statute and inconsistent with the relatively bright line established by the Legislature. Moreover, such a test would be practically unmanageable, requiring a case-by-case analysis to determine if a part was substantial enough to serve as a proxy for a motor vehicle. This would lead to a line-drawing conundrum for courts of appeals. The Legislature did not create an exception to the statute's requirement of actual physical contact with a motor vehicle, and we decline to do so. In addition, "creation of an integral part test would force courts to draw lines in each case along a continuum, to determine whether a particular part was large or important enough to be 'integral,' whether the part was a piece of the vehicle or merely cargo, and whether the part was contemporaneously separated from the vehicle or had lain in the roadway long enough to become debris. All of these questions would open the door to uncertainty and potential fraudulent or fictitious claims, which the Legislature saw fit not to do."
- ON THE DISSENT'S PROPOSED INTEGRAL PART TEST: "In my view, when an integral part of an unidentified vehicle is propelled by the vehicle's momentum and, in a continuous and unbroken sequence of events, collides with an insured's vehicle, “actual physical contact” with a “motor vehicle” has occurred and coverage is afforded under the statute. Because the Court holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent."
- ON WHY THE MAJORITY'S TEST IS CONTRARY TO THE STATUTE'S LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE "Nothing in the statute itself compels the Court's conclusion that only a collision with the motor vehicle as a whole will satisfy the statute, and the Court's restrictive interpretation of section 1952.104(3) places that provision in tension with the UM statute's fundamental purpose." "We have repeatedly and consistently held that because the UM statute is remedial, it should be construed liberally to give full effect to the Legislature's purpose in enacting it-to provide coverage to insured motorists."
On Criminal Justice
On the Death Penalty
On Labor Law
Issue: Does the principle of res judicata bar an employee from bringing a common-law claim against employer to recover unpaid wages after the Texas Workforce Commission(TWC) dismissed his claim as untimely filed?
Factual History: Plaintiff, under employment agreement with Defendant, alleges that Defendant terminated his employment without cause on Jan. 19, 2000, which entitled him to post-termination salary. Eighteen months later, Plaintiff filed a wage loss claim with TWC.
Summary:Judge Wainwright authored the majority opinion, over the dissents of Judges Brister, Jefferson, and O’Neill, which ruled that when a claimant pursues a wage claim to a final adjudication before the TWC, res judicata bars the claimant from later filing a lawsuit for the same damages in a Texas court of law. The court held: (1) the TWC had subject matter jurisdiction (2) the doctrine of res judicata bars the plaintiff from pursuing relief in a court of law after obtaining a final decision in TWC for the same transaction.
- On Why the TWC had Subject Matter Jursidiction: “We interpret the words of the Legislature to have created the 180-day filing limitations period as a mandatory condition to pursuing the administrative cause of action and not as a bar to TWC's exercise of jurisdiction. TWC's use of the word “dismissed” in its order does not alter its jurisdiction. TWC had jurisdiction over Igal's claim.”
- On Why Res Judicata Bars the Plaintiff's Claims: once a claimant who has alternate proceedings at his disposal to obtain relief available under the Payday Law pursues an administrative claim to a final decision, he forgoes his common law claims. To pursue a common law remedy for the same wages as sought *89 in his payday claim, a claimant must withdraw his administrative claim before the agency issues a final decision. Because Igal did not withdraw his administrative claim prior to TWC's final determination, res judicata will bar his claim if TWC's order is considered final for the purposes of res judicata.
- On the Dissents Reasoning: The Texas Legislature passed the Payday Law to give unpaid workers a quick alternative to lengthy civil litigation. But today the Court holds they lose everything if they pursue that alternative a little too late, even though years remain to file suit in court. This is not about biting apples twice; this is about a man's wages, a claim that like many others can be filed a second time if the first disposition was not on the merits. By holding Payday claims dismissed for tardiness cannot be refiled in court, the Court converts a law giving extra options to workers into a trap where they may forfeit all their rights.
On Freedom of Expression
On Discrimination and Equal Protection
On Education
On Elections Law
On Employer and Employee Rights
On Family Law
On Government Accountability
On Gun Rights
On Negligence
Issue: Does an axle-wheel assembly spearated from an unidentified semi-trailer constitute a "motor vehicle" in order to satisfy the "actual physical contact" provision of Texas's unisured motorist statute?
Factual and Procedural History: On January 4, 2002, a station wagon collided with a drive axle and attached tandem wheels that had seperated from an eighteen-wheel semi-trailer truck. The unidentified truck, which was being driven in the opposite direction across the divided highway, did not stop. Momentum carried the axle-wheel assembly across the dividing median where it struck the station wagon, injurying the occupants and damaging the car. The County Court, Ellis County, granted insurer's summary jdugment motion, and insured appealled. The Waco Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Insurer petitioned for review.
Governing Rule: [F]or the insured to recover under the uninsured motorist coverage if the owner or operator of any motor vehicle that causes bodily injury or property damage to the insured is unknown, actual physical contact must have occurred between the motor vehicle owned or operated by the unknown person and the person or property of the insured[18]
Summary: Justice Wainwright, over the dissents of Justices O'Neill and Medina, ruled that an insurance compnay was not required to pay an uninsured motorist claim because an axle-wheel assembly seperated from an unidentified semi-trailer does not constitute a "motor vehicle," and therefore, does not fall within the terms of the policy and the Texas Insurance Code. The Court held: (1) motor vehicles are self-propelled (2) the collision does not involve a legally recognized substitute for the statute's actual physical contact requirement (3) adopting an integral part test to determine whehter actual physical contact occured would be inconsistent with the test established by the legislature and would be unmanageable
- ON WHY THE AXLE-WHEEL ASSEMBLY IS NOT A MOTOR VEHICLE: "A drive axle with two tandem wheels attached on one side lacks an engine or other means of propulsion. It is therefore neither a self-propelled vehicle nor a vehicle propelled by electric power from overhead wires. This wheel assemblage is not capable of carrying a load, nor can it be towed down a road by a self-propelled vehicle other than being dragged by or mounted underneath one, as Elchehimi's expert witness testified. The axle-wheel assembly is thus not a trailer or semitrailer designed for use with a self-propelled vehicle. The axle-wheel assembly is not a motor vehicle under Chapter 601. Applying the common usage of the term and the definition in Chapter 601, we conclude that physical contact with a detached axle and tandem wheels is not actual physical contact with a motor vehicle under the unidentified motor vehicle provision."
- ON WHY THE COLLISION DID NOT INVLOVE A LEGALLY RECOGNIZED SUBSTITUTE FOR THE STATUTE'S ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTACT REQUIREMENT: "Because the axle-wheel assembly is not a motor vehicle, it cannot fill the role of an intermediary vehicle to provide indirect contact between the unidentified truck and Plaintiff's vehicle." No other substitute exists for the requirement of actual physical contact with the motor vehicle itself. Texas courts have uniformly rejected the contention that a collision with cargo and other objects falling from a car satisfies the requirement of actual physical contact with a motor vehicle[19]
- ON WHY THE COURT DID NOT ADOPT THE INTEGRAL PART TEST: "We decline, however, to adopt an integral part test not present in the text of the statute and inconsistent with the relatively bright line established by the Legislature. Moreover, such a test would be practically unmanageable, requiring a case-by-case analysis to determine if a part was substantial enough to serve as a proxy for a motor vehicle. This would lead to a line-drawing conundrum for courts of appeals. The Legislature did not create an exception to the statute's requirement of actual physical contact with a motor vehicle, and we decline to do so. In addition, "creation of an integral part test would force courts to draw lines in each case along a continuum, to determine whether a particular part was large or important enough to be 'integral,' whether the part was a piece of the vehicle or merely cargo, and whether the part was contemporaneously separated from the vehicle or had lain in the roadway long enough to become debris. All of these questions would open the door to uncertainty and potential fraudulent or fictitious claims, which the Legislature saw fit not to do."
- ON THE DISSENT'S PROPOSED INTEGRAL PART TEST: "In my view, when an integral part of an unidentified vehicle is propelled by the vehicle's momentum and, in a continuous and unbroken sequence of events, collides with an insured's vehicle, “actual physical contact” with a “motor vehicle” has occurred and coverage is afforded under the statute. Because the Court holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent."
- ON WHY THE MAJORITY'S TEST IS CONTRARY TO THE STATUTE'S LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE "Nothing in the statute itself compels the Court's conclusion that only a collision with the motor vehicle as a whole will satisfy the statute, and the Court's restrictive interpretation of section 1952.104(3) places that provision in tension with the UM statute's fundamental purpose." "We have repeatedly and consistently held that because the UM statute is remedial, it should be construed liberally to give full effect to the Legislature's purpose in enacting it-to provide coverage to insured motorists."
On Personal Responsibility
On Property Rights
On Taxes
On Tax Increment Financing (TIF)
On Term Limits
On Tort Reform
See Also
External Links
- Dale Wainwright's dissenting opinion on the appropriateness of mandamus relief to compel dismissal of medical malpractice suits
- Dale Wainwright's Election Page
- The Supreme Court of Texas
- Dale Wainwright's Endorsements for Supreme Court Justice
- Texas Bar: Supreme Court Profile of Dale Wainwright
- Dallas Morning News Voter Guide
- Supporting Quotes on Justice Wainwright from reelection site
- NNDB profile: Dale Wainwright
- Justice Wainwright bio from Project Vote Smart
- Wikipedia: Dale Wainwright
References
- ↑ The Supreme Court of Texas: Dale Wainwright
- ↑ The Supreme Court of Texas
- ↑ Bio from Reelect Dale Wainwright Website
- ↑ The Supreme Court of Texas
- ↑ Reelect Dale Wainwright Website
- ↑ Justice speaks at SFA
- ↑ Judicial Polls
- ↑ "Voted Best Qualified" at Reelect Dale Wainwright Website
- ↑ Supporting quotes from Reelect Dale Wainwright Website
- ↑ Follow the Money: Dale Wainwright 2002
- ↑ Follow the Money: Dale Wainwright
- ↑ Follow the Money: Dale Wainwright 2008
- ↑ 249 S.W.3d 430
- ↑ Tex. Ins. Code sect. 1952.104(3)
- ↑ See, e.g., Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Deville, 988 S.W.2d 331, 333-34 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.)
- ↑ 250 S.W.3d 78
- ↑ 249 S.W.3d 430
- ↑ Tex. Ins. Code sect. 1952.104(3)
- ↑ See, e.g., Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Deville, 988 S.W.2d 331, 333-34 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.)
